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ROBIN COOKE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE PACIFIC DIMENSION 
Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG* 
Lord Cooke's life as lawyer and judge was astonishing in its achievements. The author traces his 
counter-cultural embrace of notions of human rights both in case decisions and in scholarly 
articles. He describes Lord Cooke's approach to judging – a mixture of orthodoxy and radical new 
ideas. He describes his contribution to the emergence of a distinctive New Zealand jurisprudence, 
curiously asserted in advance of the termination of Privy Council appeals and before similar 
"liberation" in Australia. The author concludes with a reminder of Lord Cooke's prediction of a 
"common law of the world". He suggests that building an effective regional human rights 
mechanism for the Pacific would be a timely and practical contribution to that ideal. 
I LUMINARY AND FRIEND 
Robin Brunskill Cooke was an outstanding jurist. He was my friend. It has been said that he was 
one of the finest judges that New Zealand has produced.1 He was the first judge from New Zealand 
to be made a life peer.2 He was also the first Commonwealth judge to participate in the Appellate 
  
* Justice of the High Court of Australia. I acknowledge the assistance of Mr Adam Sharpe, legal research 
officer in the Library of the High Court of Australia.  
1  Sir Michael Hardie Boys, when Governor-General, described Cooke as "undoubtedly one of New Zealand's 
intellectual giants" and "arguably [New Zealand's] greatest Judge". See the speech, given at the opening of 
the Legal Research Foundation Conference, Auckland, 4 and 5 April 1997, reproduced in Paul Rishworth 
(ed) The Struggle for Simplicity in the Law: Essays for Lord Cooke of Thorndon (Butterworths, New 
Zealand, 1997) 331, 336. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, past Prime Minister and now President of the New Zealand 
Law Commission went further, asserting that "it must [be] recognised that Lord Cooke is the greatest 
[j]udge that New Zealand has produced": see McGuire v Hastings District Council [2002] 2 NZLR 577, 584 
(PC).  
2  Peter Spiller New Zealand Court of Appeal 1958-1996: A History (Brookers, Wellington, 2002) 121. He 
became Baron Cooke of Thorndon of Wellington in New Zealand, and of Cambridge in the County of 
Cambridgeshire. 
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Committee of the House of Lords deciding United Kingdom appeals.3 This says a lot about him. It 
also says much about the United Kingdom. 
His remarkable life's journey has been recounted many times.4 This contribution aims to 
provide some reflections upon his legacy. That is no easy task, for he has influenced the 
jurisprudence not only of New Zealand but of the wider common law world. His contribution to law 
extends across the horizon of many legal subjects.5 In my essay, I shall refer to him as Cooke. In his 
lifetime, I was privileged to call him by his given name; but that appellation would be too familiar 
for a work of this kind. He wore all of his titles – Mr, Justice, Sir, Lord and Baron – with equal 
grace. For him what mattered most were ideas. He would not object to the simplicity of Cooke. 
I aim to isolate a few aspects of his legacy. I will examine his contribution to understandings of 
human rights and the role of the judge. I will explore his part in the development of a distinctive 
New Zealand jurisprudence. I will then consider the prospects for a Pacific Charter of Rights as a 
rational outcome, beyond New Zealand and Australia, of the kind of causes that Cooke espoused as 
a judge and as a citizen. 
Without delay, I hope that a biographer worthy of the task will provide a detailed description 
and analysis of Cooke's life and legacy. In the meantime, I applaud the initiative of the Victoria 
University of Wellington to compile a special issue of this journal to commemorate Cooke. He was, 
of course, richly decorated with the outward trappings of ermine and medallions of gold and enamel. 
Now that his physical presence is no more, we are left with the still vivid recollections of his 
personality and the treasury of his writings revealing the workings of the mind of a modern man 
concerned to better the condition of the law and the human condition within society. 
II HUMAN RIGHTS 
A great teacher: During a discussion about human rights, in an ABC radio interview which 
Cooke and I shared in 2000, I referred to him as "one of the great teachers in this area [of the 
  
Peter Spiller "Lord Cooke of Thorndon: The New Zealand Dimension" (2002) 10 Waikato LR 55, 61. 
See for example Nilay B Patel "Lord Cooke of Thorndon (1926-2006): 51 Years in the Law" (2006) 32 
3  
4  
5  
, 
 335, 336. 
CLB 443; Peter Spiller "Lord Cooke of Thorndon: an appreciation" [2006] NZLJ 321; Sian Elias "Eulogy 
for Lord Cooke of Thorndon" [2006] NZLJ 323 and in this issue, and my own tribute: (2006) 80 ALJ 868.  
Chief Justice Elias has observed that "There is no area of law that his judgments do not touch." See Elias, 
above n 4, 324. Mr Geoff McLay has written that "Lord Cooke inhabited the subjects that I studied and that 
I teach. It was simply impossible to make sense of New Zealand law in diverse areas like tort, contract
constitutional law, equity or trusts without directly confronting Lord Cooke's view of the law as a whole." 
See Geoff McLay "Sir Robin Cooke" (2006) 37 VUWLR
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law]".6 Chief Justice Sian Elias has also referred to his "deep commitment to human rights".7 His 
passion for, and contribution to, human rights jurisprudence in Australasia, and across the common 
law world, were enormous. They provide the starting point for this reflection. 
 
A rights-based approach: Cooke argued that a fundamental shift had come upon the rule of law 
in the common law world in recent decades. He saw a movement in our law from a somewhat 
negative or passive view about the rule of law to a more active one, affirmatively defensive of 
human rights:8 
The Diceyan concept of the rule of law was that citizens may do what they like unless the State has 
sufficiently express powers of intervention.  [This] is steadily being replaced by more positive thinking 
in terms of the identifiable rights of human beings which States are bound to respect and further. 
In the New Zealand context, Cooke's understanding of the effect of the adoption of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 certainly suggests that his prediction was true so far as the direction 
of New Zealand law was concerned. He argued that the Bill of Rights had come to permeate both 
statute law and the common law in New Zealand, and further that:9 
[The Bill of Rights] cannot rightly be seen as some special and somewhat arcane or foreign phenomenon 
standing apart from the day-to-day practice and administration of the law. We are slowly but surely 
learning this approach in New Zealand. ... In the language being adopted in the Bloemfontein Statement, 
"in democratic societies fundamental human rights and freedoms are more than paper aspirations. They 
form part of the law".  
Legal remedies for rights: Cooke believed in the importance of integrating human rights 
principles into law. He also believed in the practical implementation of such rights. This belief is 
perhaps nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in his decision in Simpson v Attorney-General 
(Baigent's case),10 the effect of which was explained by Cooke in the following terms:11 
 
6  ABC Radio National "Politics and the Courts" (29 August 2000) The Law Report available at 
www.abc.net.au (accessed 23 March 2007). 
7  Elias "Eulogy", above n 4, 325. 
8  Robin B Cooke "Human Rights in Hong Kong" (1999) 29 VUWLR 45, 45 (emphasis in original). 
9  Robin B Cooke "A Sketch from the Blue Train – Non-discrimination and freedom of expression: The New 
Zealand Contribution" [1994] NZLJ 10, 12. 
10  Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent's case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
11  Cooke "Human Rights in Hong Kong", above n 8, 47. Compare my reasons in APLA Ltd v Legal Services 
Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322, 412 para 255 and 428-429 paras 312-313. 
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The essence of Baigent is that the enactment of a legal right is meaningless and window-dressing 
without a legal remedy; the appropriate remedy is the one most effective in the circumstances; it is the 
ic 
law d others in New Zealand itself". He responded:12 
E ucation for 
the
e for granted but which was breathtaking then."15 
 way of judicial 
rev
 
duty of the courts to provide legal remedies for the breach of legal rights. 
Cooke observed that Baigent was "the [decision] most selected for attack by some academ
yers an
The more influential the anti-Baigent school of thought in [New Zealand], the more out of touch we will 
be with the trend towards internationally-recognised human rights which is so noticeable throughout the 
world. 
International and domestic law: Cooke was thus in the vanguard in propounding the belief that 
international human rights norms were to be implemented in domestic law wherever it was 
appropriate that this should occur. In 1977, in Van Gorkon v Attorney-General,13 Cooke took into 
account the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women in deciding that conditions imposed by the Minister of d
 payment of teachers' removal expenses which discriminated on the basis of the teachers' sex 
were invalid.14 In her eulogy in Wellington, Chief Justice Sian Elias said of this decision that "[i]t 
was a leap we in New Zealand now tak
Cooke's decision in that case was to prove prescient. It preceded by more than ten years the 
Bangalore Principles which were adopted in Bangalore, India in February 1988.16 Very often, 
Cooke was a judge ahead of his time. 
In Tavita v Minister of Immigration,17 the New Zealand Court of Appeal considered the effect 
upon domestic law of an international treaty which had been ratified by the executive but not 
expressly implemented as part of domestic law by parliamentary legislation. A removal warrant had 
been executed on Mr Tavita after he had overstayed his visa. When the New Zealand Immigration 
Service took steps to remove him from the country, Mr Tavita sought relief by
iew. His case reached the New Zealand Court of Appeal. By the time of the decision, Mr Tavita 
 
12  Cooke "Human Rights in Hong Kong", above n 8, 47. 
13  Van Gorkon v Attorney-General [1977] 1 NZLR 535 (SC). 
14  Ibid, 542-543 Cooke J. Contrast New South Wales v Amery (2006) 80 ALJR 753 (HCA). 
15  Elias "Eulogy", above n 4, 325. 
16  For discussion of the Bangalore Principles, see for example my article "Domestic Implementation of 
International Human Rights Norms" (1999) 5 AJHR 109, especially 115-116. 
17  Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257. 
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had married and a daughter had been born in New Zealand. She was a New Zealand citizen. If 
expulsion were upheld, Mr Tavita would be separated from his wife and daughter.  
As President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Cooke, on behalf of the Court, delivered an 
inte al 
Cov United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Chi
ently implying that New Zealand's adherence to the international 
nfluenced, the decision of the High Court of 
Au
adian-born children by the time of the order. The 
app
rim decision. He identified the argument of the executive as being that the Internation
enant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the 
ld 1989 ("UNCROC") did not have to be considered at all in determining whether to order Mr 
Tavita's removal. Although not making a final decision on that argument, Cooke commented:18 
That is an unattractive argument, appar
instruments has been at least partly window-dressing. 
The case was ultimately resolved without further recourse to the courts, when the Minister of 
Immigration permitted Mr Tavita to remain in New Zealand.19 However, an important blow had 
been struck and it was to be repeated. 
Tavita's legacy: Tavita demonstrates the international impact of Cooke's decision-making. The 
decision in Tavita predates, and seems likely to have i
stralia in Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh.20 In Teoh, the High Court 
held that Mr Teoh, also an applicant for a visa, had a legitimate expectation that the Australian 
Minister for Immigration would act in accordance with UNCROC, which Australia too had ratified 
but not yet implemented by statute in domestic law.21  
In Baker v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,22 the Supreme Court of Canada was 
presented with similar factual circumstances. In that case, the executive had ordered that the 
appellant be deported for overstaying her visitor's visa and working in Canada illegally. The 
appellant had given birth to no fewer than four Can
ellant sought to be exempted from the requirement of applying for permanent residence outside 
Canada. She did so by seeking the exercise of the power to admit a person to Canada on the basis of 
  
19  Final 
20   (1995) 183 CLR 273. See, for example, the 
21  
 Justice Nicholson, Australian Family Law and International Human Rights" 
 and Immigration [1999] 2 SCR 817.  
18  Ibid, 266 Cooke P. 
See Robin B Cooke "The Dream of an International Common Law" in Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of 
Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (The Federation Press, Annandale (NSW), 1996) 144. 
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh
reasons of Toohey J at page 300, in which he quotes Tavita. 
Although some cold water has been thrown on the authority of Teoh, it has not been expressly overruled: 
see Michael D Kirby "Chief
(2004) 5 Melb JIL 221, 237. 
22  Baker v Minister of Citizenship
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humanitarian and compassionate considerations pursuant to regulations made under section 114(2) 
of the Immigration Act 1985 ("Immigration Act"). 
The Canadian Supreme Court did not hold that a legitimate expectation with legal consequences 
had rt 
con NCROC indicated "the importance of considering the 
nder section 114(2) of the Immigration Act.25 
 the proposition that:27 
ergoing evolution".28 The evolution 
was
rights 
stan
 
 been created by Canada's ratification of UNCROC.23 However, a majority of the Cou
sidered that Canada's ratification of U
interests of children"24 when exercising the power u
The Court observed that:26 
the values reflected in international human rights law may help inform the contextual approach to 
statutory interpretation and judicial review. 
Tavita was cited in support of
The important role of international human rights law as an aid to interpreting domestic law has also been 
emphasised in other common law countries. 
The appeal was allowed. 
By the time Tavita was decided, Cooke was clearly correct to say that relationship between 
international human rights norms and domestic law was "und
 occurring and continues to do so in New Zealand, Australia, and elsewhere.29 Cooke played an 
important part in the process that he described. Indeed, the developments in this area led Chief 
Justice Elias to remark (referring to the words of Sedley LJ) that "[n]ow, international human 
dards 'march with the common law'."30 
 
23  Ibid, 841 L'Heureux-Dubé J.  
24  Ibid, 860 para 69 L'Heureux-Dubé J.   
25  L'Heureux-Dubé J wrote the reasons of the majority. Cory and Iacobucci JJ, in the minority on this issue, 
concluded that international law which had not been implemented in domestic legislation could not affect 
statutory interpretation. 
26  Baker, above n 22, 817, 861 para 70 L'Heureux-Dubé J. 
27  Ibid. See also Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42. 
28  Tavita, above n 17, 266 Cooke J. 
29  See my earlier discussion of this phenomenon in Michael D Kirby "Lord Cooke and Fundamental Rights" in 
Rishworth, above n 1, 331, 346-348. 
30  Sian Elias "Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-go-round" (2003) 14 PLR 148, 157, 
citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte McQuillan [1995] 4 All ER 400, 422 
Sedley LJ (CA).  
 
 ROBIN COOKE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PACIFIC DIMENSION 125 
Common law of the world: The insight that international and domestic law were becoming more 
interactive probably informed Cooke's view that a common law of the world was gradually 
develop  civilised countries. 
 delivered on 17 December 1997, Cooke observed that his first address on this topic, 
years earlier, had been titled "The Dream of an International Common Law". He 
obs of 
the
 
many, many years ahead. But that it is ahead I am reasonably confident. In at least 
e the new lex mercatoria, and is otherwise 
ights, encapsulated at the most general level in the Universal Declaration 
g Uncitral). 
The
 
ing. For him, it was at least a kind of international common law of
In a speech
delivered two 
erved that a fortnight earlier, he had delivered a paper "called, more boldly, The Common Law 
 World".31 He went on:32 
So you will infer that I gained a little in confidence over the two years. 
He continued: 
The title of [the latter] lecture was avowedly proleptic. No one suggests that there is yet a common law
of the world. It is 
three main areas, one can see clear evidence of progress in that direction. 
The three identified areas were:33 
• [The] interaction between national jurisdictions in the use of precedents, a form of cross-
fertilisation; 
• [T]he gradual development of what is called by som
known by various descriptions such as general principles of international commercial law; and 
• [T]he great one of human r
of Human Rights. 
In a lecture delivered in October 2003, Cooke identified:34 
[A] widespread movement towards a common law of the world in the fields of human rights and 
commercial law (e
 idea of a common law of the world is a powerful, evocative one. Like Cooke, I also see a 
developing movement towards a greater recognition and reflection of universal human rights in 
 
31  Robin B Cooke "The Judge in an Evolving Society" (1998) 28 VUWLR 467, 469. It appears that the paper 
entitled The Common Law of the World was not published although Cooke indicated that some of it was 
adapted and incorporated into the speech "Party Autonomy": see Robin B Cooke "Party Autonomy" (1999) 
30 VUWLR 256, 268, footnote 18.  
32  Cooke "The Judge in an Evolving Society", ibid, 469 (emphasis in original).  
33  Ibid, 469, 470-471 and 471 respectively. 
34  Robin B Cooke "The Road Ahead for the Common Law" (2004) 53 Int'l & Comp LQ 273, 273. 
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domestic law. As a judge, Cooke showed himself to be respectful of universal human rights and 
human dignity although he was careful not to promote these norms in a manner inconsistent with his 
judicial functions. 
Those of us brought up in Commonwealth countries, formerly linked through the Privy Council 
to a rich source of comparative law materials, were aware all our professional lives of the value of 
comparative law stimuli for our analogical reasoning. What was new, and called to notice by Cooke, 
ct of treaty law, its increasing importance in resolving 
bus
of international human rights law as an impetus to action and as a touchstone for 
our
eng
In h ot 
sov s about the proper role of the courts:36 
making in many spheres of the nation's life. Certainly the courts 
amental common 
law
legislative or administrative intent should prevail is untold and huge. 
Cooke was never in doubt that judges develop the law. In 1989, he wrote:38 
was the very large growth in the impa
iness disputes and the greater willingness to look beyond the familiar sources for relevant 
materials, namely the courts of the old British Dominions. Pervading it all, there was the steadily 
growing impact 
 own legal advances. 
III APPROACH TO JUDGING 
An activist judge?: Chief Justice Elias observes that Cooke did not see himself as a social 
ineer:35 
Contrary to folklore, Lord Cooke believed that it is not the role of the judge to mould society. 
is article "The Myth of Sovereignty", Cooke explained his view as to why the courts were n
ereign. In so doing, he gave an insight into his thought
Despite the quite widespread pejorative misuse of the term "activist", judges cannot initiate action and ... 
disclaim responsibility for decision-
make common law, developing it usually by a gradual process of accretion and modification, 
sometimes, though, by giant strides. ... As regards legislation, however, the conventional judicial 
approach is confined to interpretation in the ordinary sense. 
In discussing criticisms of his position (and that of like-minded judges) on fund
 rights, Cooke responded that:37 
The number of decisions in which judges of the criticized school of thought have recognized that actual 
  
36  
Constitutional and Administrative Law 
34, 273, 278. 
35  Elias "Eulogy", above n 4, 325.  
Robin B Cooke "The Myth of Sovereignty" (2005) 3 NZJPIL 39, 42-43. For a description of Cooke's 
opinion of the use of the term "judicial activist" see Philip A Joseph 
in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 756 [20.4.2]. 
37  Cooke "The Road Ahead for the Common Law", above n 
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In New Zealand there has been for some time a tendency to some judicial glasnost. ... It has become less 
common to pretend that questions can be solved by combining bits of existing knowledge or precedent...  
hat deciding a new point may not be primarily a process 
Ind
judicial function. I explained 
how
had do not make law. I observed that:41 
I ad
t was central to the judicial function was not a 
den is 
cen
 whose concern is naturally with policy, judges have as their primary role 
c ses were socially or politically controversial. In fact, for Cooke, impartiality 
 
There is now a more open acknowledgement t
of deduction 
eed, in the following year, he observed:39 
Every judicial decision, to some extent, makes law, since cases cannot be decided by computer, but the 
great majority are not concerned with frontiers of legal development. 
My agreement with this assessment of the judicial method is well known.40 In a recent article, I 
paid specific tribute to Cooke's impact upon our understanding of the 
 the "legal Reformation" which occurred "particularly in the latter part of the twentieth century" 
 dispelled the myth that judges 
Greater honesty and candour about judicial reasoning is the abiding legacy of the enlightenment that 
came with the legal Reformation. 
ded that "[i]n New Zealand, [this development] is a great legacy of Sir Robin Cooke's time as 
President of the Court of Appeal". 
Separation of powers: Cooke explained that wha
ial of the notion that judges create law. Instead, he argued that impartiality in adjudication 
tral to the proper performance of that function:42 
[U]nlike politicians
impartiality. The two vocations are essentially different, despite from time to time an inevitable overlap 
in some grey areas. 
The key role of impartiality did not mean that judges should shy away from cases before them, 
even if these a
 
40  
, 
41  by "'Judicial Activism'?: A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation" (2005) 11 Otago L Rev 1, 
42  partiality in 
38  RB Cooke "Fairness" (1989) 19 VUWLR 421, 421-422. 
39  Robin B Cooke "Dynamics of the Common Law" [1990] NZLJ 261, 262. 
See, for example, Michael D Kirby "Judicial Activism: Power without Responsibility? No, Appropriate 
Activism Conforming to Duty" (2006) 30 Melb ULR 576; Michael D Kirby Judicial Activism: Authority
Principle and Policy in the Judicial Method (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) (Hamlyn Lectures). 
Michael D Kir
14-15. 
Cooke "The Myth of Sovereignty", above n 36, 41. On the great importance of integrity and im
carrying out the judicial task, see Cooke "The Judge in an Evolving Society", above n 31, 468. 
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dem al 
con
tries to accept the unwelcome or 
In t
ere the judicial role is not to resolve the 
mocratic societies fundamental human rights and freedoms ... form 
par on 
hum
red human rights declarations. It is the generality and character of the declarations that 
 the process is not 
 
anded the resolution of difficult legal issues in cases with important political and soci
sequences:43 
There is not much point in accepting judicial office unless one 
disturbing, but crucially independent, responsibilities that go with it. 
he particular context of administrative law, he argued that:44 
judicial review is a demanding arena, as the Courts cannot shrink from rulings bearing on even the most 
socially divisive issues of the day – political, moral, economic. H
issues but to act as a check or to keep the ring, trying to ensure that those responsible for decisions in the 
community do so in accordance with law, fairly and reasonably. 
Respect for human rights: Cooke's judicial decisions also demonstrate that approaching the 
judicial function with impartiality does not require a restrictive or overly verbalistic approach in 
interpreting the law regarding fundamental rights and freedoms. In discussing the Bloemfontein 
Statement's principle that "in de
t of the law", Cooke provided guidance regarding the interpretation of laws that touch up
an rights and freedoms:45 
[I]n blending [fundamental human rights and freedoms] into the corpus of the law, Judges have to learn 
to rise above any black-letter technique, avoiding what Lord Wilberforce has famously labelled "the 
austerity of tabulated legalism". In Privy Council judgments often cited, the great British Judges 
Wilberforce and Diplock have recommended a generous approach to the interpretation or application of 
broad-textu
makes this approach apt. Whether or not a given declaration is also entrenched in supreme law is beside 
the point. 
The principle of fairness: Nor, for Cooke, did impartiality exclude considerations of fairness. 
His basic approach to judicial decision-making is revealed by his explanation that
 
44  
roblems and Prospects (Oxford University Press/Legal 
45  
ddresses 1977-1988 (Maritime Law Association of Australia and 
8. 
43  Robin B Cooke "The Challenge of Treaty of Waitangi Jurisprudence" (1994) 2 Waikato LR 1, 6. 
Robin B Cooke "The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law" in Michael Taggart (ed) Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s: P
Research Foundation, Auckland, 1986) 1, 16-17. 
Cooke "A Sketch from the Blue Train", above n 9, 12, citing Lord Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs 
v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 328 (PC (Bermuda)). Lord Wilberforce told Cooke that he believed that the phrase 
was to be attributed to Benjamin Cardozo: Robin B Cooke "Practicalities of a Bill of Rights" in W K 
Hastings (ed) F S Dethridge Memorial A
New Zealand, Auckland, 1989) 71, 7
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sim
 which this quotation is taken, simply titled "Fairness", is a highly instructive 
acc
.49 In that essay, he suggested an underlying principle for judicial 
rev le 
exp
 ambit of the more 
spe
e ystifying law: Cooke's strong belief in simplifying and demystifying legal discourse was 
also to 
task
, nullity, jurisdiction, jurisdictional fact, the face of the record. ... 
 
ply one of deduction from existing legal principle but rather it involves "the search ... for the 
solution that seems fair and just after balancing all the relevant considerations."46 
The article from
ount of how "fairness" can and, at least in the law of New Zealand,47 does play a vital role in 
shaping the law.48 
A fine example of Cooke's approach in this respect appears in his essay "The Struggle for 
Simplicity in Administrative Law"
iew that has remained in my mind since I first read it because of the power of its simp
osition of the legal bedrock:50 
It is submitted for your consideration that the substantive principles of judicial review are simply that 
the decision-maker must act in accordance with law, fairly and reasonably. 
For Cooke, this was the very core of judicial review. In his opinion, the
cific tools of administrative law did not need to be circumscribed. They could safely be left 
flexible and adaptive so as to serve the three bedrock principles that he named. 
D m
 evident in that essay. Thus, he took the common use of administrative law expressions 
:51 
Serving a useful enough purpose in their day, they are seen in time to distract attention from the true 
question: terms like quasi-judicial
Obscure concepts hinder progress. So to attempt more direct and more candid formulations of principle 
has more than semantic purpose. 
 
46  Cooke "Fairness", above n 38, 422.  
47  Cooke suggested that, in 1987, the High Court of Australia followed a similar approach. He cited extracts 
from the joint reasons of Mason CJ and Wilson and Deane JJ in Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 
CLR 137 as an example.  
48  For a discussion of Cooke's explicit use of "fairness" in judicial decisions, see Spiller New Zealand Court of 
Appeal, above n 2, 121, and generally at 131-133. 
49  Cooke "The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law", above n 44. The title for the Festschrift for 
Cooke, The Struggle for Simplicity in the Law: Essays for Lord Cooke of Thorndon, was no doubt intended 
to allude to that essay's title.  
50  Ibid, 5. For a more comprehensive overview of Cooke's approach, see Joseph, above n 36, 777 [20.9].  
51  Cooke "The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law", above n 44, 5. 
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The same approach is also evident in his strong preference for the use of "reasonable" and 
"unreasonable" in characterising decisions subject to review instead of "[v]ituperative epithets like 
perverse, frivolous [and] foolish" or "distracting circumlocutions" such as "'[s]o unreasonable that 
no reasonable authority could come to it'".52 We see at work here a legal mind of the highest order, 
sharpened by decades of daily experience participating with others in courts of great ability. His was 
the kind of mind that was at home and comfortable in the winding valleys and byroads of law's 
cou
ays taking the 
trou
energy, as evidenced both by his judicial output and his extrajudicial contributions. 
as red to concrete realities by 
es of da actical and often mundane 
leg
 
ntless problems. But, it could also soar to lofty heights and look down and survey everything 
below – identifying the entire terrain and showing ways to cut through obstructions once the 
topography of law was more clearly perceived. 
I agree wholeheartedly with Cooke's sentiments in this respect. This is a topic about which I 
have written.53 The movement towards the simplification of legal language has made progress and I 
trust that the progress will continue and accelerate. Yet even more important than simple language 
are simple concepts of law. The common law system, and common law techniques, can sometimes 
be resistant to over-arching concepts. We solve immediate problems without alw
ble to identify our basic concepts or without even being sure that any exist. Cooke was one of 
those rare judicial birds who struggled to see and to describe the concepts. This was because of the 
power of his mind combined with the length and variety of his high judicial offices. 
Personal qualities: It is important to mention the personal qualities that Cooke demonstrated as 
a judge. While on the bench, he certainly displayed courage in fulfilling the "unwelcome or 
disturbing ... responsibilities" that judicial office required him to bear. Professor Spiller was correct 
to discern that Cooke "possessed a deep-rooted humanity".54 He was also enormously industrious, 
with unflagging 
He w  a true intellectual. However his creative capacity was safely tethe
decad y to day decision-making as a judge resolving highly pr
al problems. 
 
Ibid, 14-15; see also 16. On Cooke's use of conc52  ise and simple statements of the law, see further 
: Essays on Plain Language 
54  2, 121, and generally 121-122. 
Peter Spiller "A Commonwealth Judge at Work: Lord Cooke in the House of Lords and Privy Council" 
(2003) 3 OUCLJ 29, 34-35. 
53  See, for example, my review of Joseph Kimble Lifting the Fog of Legalese
(Carolina Academic Press, Durham (NC), 2006) in (2006) 80 ALJ 623.  
Spiller New Zealand Court of Appeal, above n 
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IV 
 with very few exceptions, New Zealand case law 
clo
iticism of 1956. In 
Australia
o ger time – or perhaps because of this – the asserted legal 
ind
rt 
of Appeal. In 1984, he reported that:59 
re 
attu ominion status."60 By 1988, he was 
even more emphatic about the distinctiveness of New Zealand law:61 
 
A DISTINCTIVE NEW ZEALAND JURISPRUDENCE 
Evolution to distinctiveness: Before the 1960s,
sely followed English legal principles. Chief Justice Elias has observed that:55 
In 1956, on his return from Cambridge, [Cooke] criticised the New Zealand judiciary for its 
"unquestioning compliance" with English case law. 
During Cooke's time as a judicial officer in New Zealand, the pace of the evolution of a New 
Zealand jurisprudence accelerated greatly. This movement, to which he was one – but by no means 
the only – contributor, resulted in the creation of a distinctive New Zealand jurisprudence.56 In 
delivering The Robin Cooke Lecture 2003, Chief Justice Elias observed that "[n]o one has 
contributed more than Lord Cooke of Thorndon" to the development in New Zealand of "a home in 
thought for New Zealand law".57 In a sense, the legal environment that welcomed and encouraged 
fresh opinions was also one that recognised the merit of the young Cooke's cr
, a similar movement eventually emerged. Strangely, it seems to have done so mainly as an 
outcome of the severance of the Privy Council links, finally achieved in 1986.58 Although New 
Zealand retained those links for a l n
ependence emerged earlier and seemed at first, if anything, more assertive. 
Cooke was first appointed a judge in 1972. In 1976, he was elevated to the New Zealand Cou
A low-key, unspectacular, but quite deliberate, movement has been taking place in New Zealand case 
law in recent years. In various directions we have been cautiously evolving a New Zealand common 
law. 
This was said by Cooke to "perhaps suggest that the New Zealand judicial system is now mo
ned to [a] wider role than in the eras of Colonial and then D
 
55  Elias "Eulogy" [2006], above n 4, 325, citing Robin B Cooke "The Supreme Tribunal of the British 
56  nctive jurisprudence, see Spiller New Zealand Court of Appeal, above n 2, 
57   Something New: Constitutional Stirrings and the Supreme Court" (2004) 2 
racticalities of a Bill of Rights, above n 45, 71, 83. 
Commonwealth?" (1956) 32 NZLJ 233, 235.  
For some discussion of that disti
chapter 17, especially 394-409. 
Sian Elias "Something Old,
NZJPIL 121, 137.  
58  Australia Acts 1986 (Cth and UK), s 11. 
59  Cooke "P
60  Ibid, 83. 
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The stage has now been reached in which in virtually every major field of law New Zealand law is 
radically, or at least very considerably, different from English law. 
In part, this evolution was the product of a greater willingness of New Zealand judges to 
con re 
seri
. United States cases and texts, 
ly still remains) the most important 
infl ke 
was
ish law. He also performed the much more remarkable feat of 
lead  
ess
Lords and other superior Courts. 
 of English law, but also reaching out for legal wisdom in other 
 
sider non-English jurisprudence. In 1996, delivering his contribution to the Hamlyn lectu
es, Cooke observed that:62 
In the New Zealand Court of Appeal few significant cases would pass without consideration of at least 
Australian and Canadian case law, as well as United Kingdom decisions
including of course the Restatement, are consulted rather less frequently but almost invariably on novel 
problems in such fields as tort, contract, evidence and the Bill of Rights. 
Abiding English influence: From this exposition it is clear that, despite the evolution of a 
uniquely New Zealand law, English law remained (and probab
uence upon the development of New Zealand law. Chief Justice Elias has emphasised that Coo
 a supporter of the constitutional monarchy who:63 
... believed that in the rightful development of a New Zealand national identity "we need not throw away 
the privilege of a link to an ancient and much larger society as well". 
Internationalism and comparativism: Cooke contributed not only to making New Zealand courts 
consider relevant law other than Engl
ing English courts to consider and use non-English law in a way that had not previously been
ayed. Lord Steyn has observed:64 
[He] helped in making the House of Lords more internationalist. There was an earlier era when lip 
service was paid to comparative law and English solutions were found to be best. Lord Cooke helped to 
change that, and now there is a greater debate between the House of 
Lord Cooke understood that comparative law involved assessing different feasible solutions in their 
cultural contexts and refining solutions. 
In this approach to the decisions of foreign courts, Cooke's views resonate strongly with my own 
approach. They point the way in which Australian jurisprudence too should develop – drawing, as in 
the past, on the traditional influences
 
61  Cooke "Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158, 158. 
62  R B Cooke Turning Points of the Common Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997) 3. 
63  Elias "Eulogy", above n 4, 325. 
64  Spiller "Lord Cooke of Thorndon: The New Zealand Dimension", above n 3, 66 providing transcript of a 
part of an interview with Lord Steyn at the House of Lords on 11 June 2002. 
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com
that rich heritage as 
app
l many 
of t
to English precedent, as a kind 
of 
w 
Zea al common law. In 1993, he wrote that:68 
 
mon law jurisdictions including the United States, Canada, Ireland, South Africa, India, Hong 
Kong and, of course, New Zealand. 
The new Supreme Court: Although described by Chief Justice Elias as "a relatively late convert 
to the creation of a local final appellate court",65 Cooke eventually became an advocate for the 
abolition of appeals from New Zealand to the Privy Council.66 Given his stature in New Zealand on 
legal matters, I do not doubt that his support, when it came, was an important contributing factor 
towards the final decision. In a sense, he helped develop a New Zealand jurisprudence that was 
freed from the binding force of English law whilst continuing to draw on 
ropriate – and making the heritage even richer by the belated embrace of the English judges of a 
willingness to invoke Commonwealth jurisprudence in developing their own.  
The establishment of the Supreme Court of New Zealand is, as he recognised, a great turning 
point in the development of the law of New Zealand.67 It is not entirely unconnected that, in 2008, 
the United Kingdom will inaugurate its own Supreme Court, divorced from the House of Lords, 
installed in a new building across Parliament Square, but taking with the books and personne
he precious ideas of comparative and human rights law advocated by Cooke during his service 
on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and in the House of Lords in its last decade. 
An apparent contradiction?: One might ask if Cooke's view that a common law of the world is 
evolving is inconsistent with his energetic contribution to the development of a distinctly New 
Zealand jurisprudence? For example, it might be thought that the development of a common law of 
the world would be hastened by New Zealand's continued adherence 
transnational jurisprudence operating on the exact opposite side of the world and not by 
stimulating yet another distinct and separate municipal legal system. 
The resolution of this apparent contradiction lies in the contribution that Cooke saw that Ne
land could make to the internation
 
65  Sian Elias "Something Old, Something New: Constitutional Stirrings and the Supreme Court" (2004) 2 
NZJPIL 121, 122. Cooke first revealed his change of view on this subject in an address to the New Zealand 
Law Conference in October 1987. See Robin B Cooke "The New Zealand National Legal Identity" (1987) 3 
Cant LR 171, 180-183. 
66  See, for example, Cooke "A Sketch from the Blue Train", above n 9, 14. 
67  I use "turning point" in reference to Cooke's Hamlyn Lectures, "Turnings Points of the Common Law", 
which examined four key cases that developed the common law. Cooke's judicial service likewise marks an 
important turning point in the common law of New Zealand and New Zealand law generally. 
68  Cooke "A Sketch from the Blue Train", above n 9, 14. 
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All democratic nations contribute to the universal law, slowly but inevitably evolving, as to freedom of 
speech and other basic human rights. 
That opinion was written before his first essay appeared examining the concept of a common 
law of the world. It reveals an earlier explanation of his idea. It provides an important insight into 
his vision for the common law of the world. It is a system of laws that would not be imposed by one 
national jurisdiction upon others but would emerge over time from the development of the law in 
different j riu sdictions across the world and by the cross-fertilisation of these developments as 
bet e 
obs
mmon law. Seen now from a wider perspective, contributions from the various 
on law of the world was built upon a 
hum
ments of ideals – concepts that we strive to attain in day to day legal practice. 
Lik
w of the world involved, I hope that it will be realised. Contemporary 
 
ween the courts of many nations engaged in a free dialogue. In his Hamlyn lectures, Cook
erved:69 
[T]he shrinking of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council can be said to have in truth promoted the 
development of the co
jurisdictions can be weighed according to their intrinsic merits rather than by mentally allotting them 
places in a hierarchy. 
If there is one clear source to stimulate the development of a common law of the world, it must 
surely be that great body of international law that developed after the Second World War concerned 
with human rights and also, with increasing power in recent decades, concerned with international 
and regional trade and commerce. Cooke's vision of a comm
anistic belief that there will ultimately be universal recognition of fundamental legal principles, 
including those relating to human rights and basic freedoms.  
Some sceptical souls will dismiss these ideas as dreams of elderly judges dreaming of Nirvana 
on this Earth before they go elsewhere where they might (or might not) find such bliss. I accept that 
there is a large amount of idealism in Cooke's vision. But the very notions of justice, fairness and 
due process are state
ewise with human rights. There are ideals that modern lawyers should never be ashamed of or 
embarrassed about.  
Contribution to a noble ideal: Cooke's vision for the law was of a future in which domestic legal 
systems develop law that is distinctive but also grounded in a core of universal principles. These 
legal systems would provide solutions appropriate to local circumstances, history and culture. 
However, they would also provide universal recognition for basic or fundamental human rights. 
Gradually, step by patient step, many nations and their legal systems are moving towards the 
recognition of fundamental human rights and freedoms in their domestic law. If this is what Cooke's 
prediction for a common la
 
69  Cooke Turning Points of the Common Law, above n 62, 3. 
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law  and judges in countries such yers as New Zealand and Australia are privileged to play a part in 
adv
and the lectern to give his thoughts a concrete shape. As well, he dreamed about the 
futu
e held for the law – 
at o
milar ideals of governance, a 
larg
t e legal 
 
ancing this noble ideal. 
V A PACIFIC CHARTER? 
Human rights in the Pacific: I now want to attempt one of those leaps of the imagination that 
Cooke quite often made. I hope that it can be accomplished with the same apparently effortless skill. 
Cooke not only wrote as a scholar and judge about global human rights. He also did practical things 
from the bench 
re of the discipline of law. And he shared his dreams with us to stimulate, focus and advance our 
own thinking.  
One practical way in which we might seek to realise Cooke's goal of a common law of the 
world, incorporating fundamental human rights, would be to create a bill or charter of rights for the 
Pacific region – our immediate neighbourhood. Such a regional charter of rights might cover New 
Zealand, Australia, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Island states and self-governing entities. A 
Pacific Charter of Rights would certainly be consistent with the vision that Cook
nce principled, founded in rules, upheld by independent courts and other bodies and based on 
universal rules given effect in the distinctive environment of one's own nation.  
Regional charters of rights are already established for Europe,70 the Americas71 and Africa.72 
All of these regions have courts and/or commissions to give effect to the fundamental rights that 
they espouse and to decide individual claims. Only Asia and the Pacific now stand outside this 
global network of institutions for human rights protection. If the attainment of a human rights 
charter and institution for Asia seems unattainable in the immediate future, the same need not be so 
for the Pacific states which share more intensive links of history, si
ely common legal tradition and many shared economic interests. This is therefore an idea that 
we should re-examine. In my view, it is far from being unattainable.  
Cooke had several important links with the Pacific Island nations. During his judicial career, he 
participated in appellate courts in Fiji, Samoa, the Cook Islands and Kiribati. His decisions in New 
Zealand were highly influential throughout the Pacific, in part because many of the fu ur
 
ber 1950) 213 UNTS 
72  
70  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 Novem
222. 
71  American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969)1144 UNTS 123. 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (27 June 1981) 1520 UNTS 217. 
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lead he 
ass ew Zealand judges to Pacific nations. In December 2001 he said:73 
mmon. I presided in hearings with judges from New 
Zea
of those who had 
fou
n rity interests" as one of the principal constitutional rules "underlying western-style 
dem e 
decl
opeless. The general similarity in content of 
 
ers of the Pacific came to New Zealand for their legal training. He was supportive of t
istance provided by N
Traditionally the New Zealand judiciary provides help in the Pacific region; and this should be catered 
for wherever needed. 
The Australian judiciary has also played a useful role in contributing to the work of courts in the 
Pacific region. Before my appointment to the High Court of Australia, between 1995 and 1996 it 
was my privilege to serve as President of the Court of Appeal of Solomon Islands. That service 
taught me the many things we held in co
land, Australia, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. The experience opened my mind to 
many practical possibilities of cooperation. 
Content of a Charter: Obviously, a Pacific Charter would be strongly influenced by the rights 
recognised by international declarations and conventions achieved under the auspices of the United 
Nations. Perhaps the strongest influence would derive from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights which Cooke once declared to be "the most important document in legal history".74 That 
Declaration, with its clear and simple text, served as a precursor to the development of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. It derived its great moral force from the sacrifice 
ght against tyranny in the Second World War and by the revelations of genocide and 
unparalleled suffering that became evident in the aftermath of that great conflict. 
One theme of a Pacific Charter would be the protection of minority rights. Cooke identified "a 
respect for mi o
ocracies".75 While acknowledging the difficulty of defining the governing notion precisely, h
ared that:76 
this does not mean that the task has to be given up as h
formal human rights declarations and instruments, broadly inspired in turn by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, represents progress towards a solution. 
 
73  Robin B Cooke Final Courts of Appeal: Some Comparisons (Occasional Paper No 7, Victoria University of 
Wellington Faculty of Law, Wellington, 2001) available at www.vuw.ac.nz (accessed 10 May 2007). 
74  See Elias "Eulogy", above n 4, 325. 
75  Robin B Cooke "Foreword" in Michael D Kirby Through the World's Eye (Federation Press, Leichhardt 
(NSW), 2000) xi, xvii. 
76  Ibid, xvii (footnote omitted). 
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There would also be a need to ensure that the recognition of basic rights applicable to all Pacific 
countries would be culturally appropriate. If it were suspected that such rights were being imposed 
on varied societies by developed nations in their midst, without consultation, the idea would never 
gain the necessary support of the diverse peoples and nations of the Pacific.  
On the other hand, it would be important not to allow concerns about cultural relativism to 
prevent the recognition of fundamental and region-wide rights. Valuable guidance could be derived 
from a return to the work of LAWASIA in the late 1980s and early 1990s on a draft of a Pacific 
Charter of Human Rights.77 That draft Charter recognised not only individual human rights but also 
imp
articular, the sense of the duty to a 
com
t or commission 
wo
ce. 
Suc
 
ortant rights of peoples and the duties of governments and individuals. The emphasis on duties 
and responsibilities would possibly help to ensure that a Pacific Charter would not interfere in an 
unacceptable way with the notions of community and, in p
munity, which exists in virtually all Pacific Island cultures.  
A Court or Commission?: To ensure that such a Pacific Charter secured greater support and 
spread its influence throughout the region, it would be essential to establish a specialised regional 
human rights commission and/or court for the Pacific region.  
In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights plays a most beneficial role of great 
importance. Its jurisdiction extends from Galway in Ireland, in the West, to Vladivostok in the 
Russian Federation, in the East. Arguably, this is the most influential court in the world today. In the 
Americas, there is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights. In Africa, there is the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. All of these institutions fulfil vital functions in 
their respective regions. In varying degrees, they have proved effective in furthering the recognition 
and defence of fundamental human rights in their respective regions. Such a cour
uld be a great asset in the Pacific region. As citizens of countries in the Pacific, we are entitled to 
ask whether the state of human rights and fundamental freedoms is so perfect in the nations of the 
Pacific region that, unlike our counterparts in Europe, the Americas and Africa we have no need for 
the checks, protection and stimulus that such commissions and courts can provide. 
In my opinion, the work of LAWASIA provides a most useful reference point for reviving 
discussion of the appropriate norms and institutions for Pacific nations. The draft Charter prepared 
by LAWASIA envisaged the creation of a Pacific Human Rights Commission in the first instan
h a Commission would have the function not only of investigating individual cases of alleged 
human rights infringements but also of conducting broader studies of human rights issues, and of 
 
77  See the draft Charter in the Report on a proposed Pacific Charter of Human Rights prepared under the 
auspices of LAWASIA, May 1989, which is published in (1992) 22 VUWLR 99, 145. 
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educating and developing awareness of human rights issues throughout the region. Such a multi-
faceted strategy for the protection of human rights would certainly be timely in our region.  
Recent events in Pacific countries point to the special need for such an institution. In Europe, the 
Am
 regional agenda. All this was done in other regions of the world it is clearly 
pos
ow quickly such a momentum can 
build up. fic 
Charter
 Island States have bills of rights incorporated within their Constitutions. 
 
ericas and Africa the process of implementing regional human rights instruments began with the 
work of a low key investigative Commission. Initially, this could be viewed as less threatening to 
governments unused to external stimuli for, or criticism of, their human rights records. In other 
regions courts have developed their jurisdictions later in time. There is every reason why a Pacific 
Charter initiative should follow a similar course.  
Prospects of a Charter: A Charter of Rights for the Pacific region is not yet a subject widely 
discussed by political leaders. It will depend upon lawyers, judges and civil society organisations to 
place the issue on the
sible and achieveable in the Pacific where the institutional, linguistic and economic 
commonalities are greater and the impediments appear less strident. Despite the present lack of a 
political momentum towards such an institution, it is remarkable h
To that end, it is worth assessing whether the necessary conditions for such a Paci
 are in place. 
One important factor that, in my view, gives cause for hope is the widespread recognition of 
basic human rights in the national, post-independence constitutions of Pacific Island nations.78 In 
1991, it was possible for Professor Patricia Hyndman to write:79 
All of the independent Pacific
The Pacific Constitutions and the bills of rights incorporated in them are all supreme law. 
Even though the rights that appear in the constitutional documents of the Pacific nations are not 
justiciable in all of these countries, the formal recognition of basically similar fundamental rights is 
a significant step in the direction of seeking to identify a core of agreed rights around which a 
Pacific Charter could cluster. 
Although New Zealand has adopted the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Australia still 
lacks a general, national charter of rights. In this respect, Australia lags behind developments that 
have occurred in virtually all other Western countries. Of course, Australia has many statutes 
 
Tonga is the only Pacific nation that was not colonised but its78   Constitution has contained basic rights since 
atricia Hyndman The Protection of Human Rights in the Pacific Region (Human 
79  
its adoption in 1875: see P
Rights Unit, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1991) 6. 
Ibid, 6 (footnote omitted). 
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prohibiting specific forms of discrimination.80 Even so, Australia still has some way to go in 
addressing forms of discrimination not presently covered by universally applicable statute law, such 
as d
e time will come, probably before long, when Australia will adopt a charter of rights, initially 
in a
states and independent entities in the Pacific 
do 
iscrimination based upon sexual orientation. Despite the lack of a national charter of rights in 
Australia some progress has recently been made towards a more comprehensive protection of 
human rights in the sub-national polities. I refer to the enactment of legislative charters of rights in 
Victoria81 and the Australian Capital Territory.82 The subject is now under consideration in 
Western Australia. 
Th
 statutory form and later, perhaps, as an amendment to the Constitution. The momentum that has 
occurred on this subject in Australia in recent years may reflect a similar mood amongst many 
Pacific states and an appreciation that our part of the world should not be cut off from the 
developments that have already occurred in other regions and that provide an example and stimulus 
to us. 
A regional necessity: The absence of a human rights charter and commission for the Pacific 
region leaves a significant void in the protection of human rights for citizens of the nations of the 
Pacific. As a matter of principle, it is difficult, or impossible, to justify the absence of a regional 
Charter and institution available to us, serving the purposes fulfilled by the charters, courts and other 
bodies operating in equivalent settings for the people of Europe, the Americas and Africa. 
The institutional void has not been filled by the adoption in the Pacific states of the most 
important human rights treaties and their incorporation in domestic law and enforcement within the 
region. Indeed, in mid-2007, of those states and self-governing entities in the Pacific, Australia and 
New Zealand are the only nation states that have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, although Nauru is a signatory.83 With respect to the ratification of the International 
Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, only Australia, New Zealand and the Solomon 
Islands have done so. This means that the majority of 
not submit to the jurisdiction of the treaty bodies that oversee adherence to the principles 
  
tion Act 1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), Disability 
ge Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). 
83  
80  For example Racial Discrimina
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), A
81  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). 
82  Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). 
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 December 1966 available at 
www.ohchr.org (accessed 18 May 2007). 
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enshrined in those treaties.84 Putting it bluntly, this is a lamentable state of affairs. The moves for a 
Pacific Commission on Human Rights would therefore serve both as a national and transnational 
stimulus to bring Pacific nations up to the mark in recognising and protecting the kind of universal 
human rights that all civilised nations should observe. 
The past decade has seen a significant growth in the number of national human rights 
institutions established in the Asian region. According to the Australian agency for international aid 
("AusAID"),85 in 1996, the Asia Pacific region had only four national human rights institutions 
accredited according to international standards.86 By mid-2007, there are 17 such bodies. The level 
of c
ghts institution. 
In 
 pool collective resources and the wisdom of the people of the Pacific towards a 
gre
o-operation between these institutions, under the auspices of the Asia-Pacific Forum of National 
Human Rights Institutions, is to be welcomed. Brian Burdekin, an eminent authority in this field, 
has written that the Asia-Pacific Forum is, in this respect, "the most effective such association in any 
region".87 This is the more remarkable because of the absence of an Asian regional human rights 
body or court, the disparity of laws and cultures in Asia and the Pacific and the presence of some 
nations ostensibly hostile to the principles of universal human rights. 
Nevertheless, these admirable developments have largely taken place in Asia, not the Pacific. In 
the Pacific region, only New Zealand, Australia and Fiji possess a national human ri
2007, the Fijian Commission has obviously been affected by yet another military coup against 
civilian government and constitutionalism in the Fiji Islands. This leaves a great number of states 
and self-governing entities in the Pacific without either a national or a regional human rights 
institution. The lack of international treaty body supervision in combination with the absence of a 
national and transational human rights institution in most countries means that a serious institutional 
void exists in human rights supervision, monitoring and protection in Pacific states. 
To some extent, the small populations of some of the states and self-governing entities in the 
Pacific help to explain why, until now, it has proved difficult for each jurisdiction to establish and 
maintain its own national human rights body. A perfect opportunity is therefore presented for a 
regional body to
ater recognition and protection of human rights. A human rights commission for the Pacific 
  
84  I applaud the ongoing efforts towards ratification of the principal international human rights treaties, for 
example at the Commonwealth Pacific Regional Workshop on the Ratification of International Human 
Rights Instruments under the Pacific Plan held at Port Moresby on 28-30 March 2007. 
85  AusAID Overseas Aid www.ausaid.gov.au (accessed 18 May 2007). 
86  These standards are set out in the "Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions" (the "Paris 
Principles", available at www.ohchr.org (accessed 17 September 2007). 
87  Brian Burdekin National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 
2007) 120. 
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would have the advantage of fulfilling the role of a region-wide institution, likely to be more aware 
of local customs and traditions than one based in Geneva, New York or as part of an Asian 
initiative. In the matter of community values, the Pacific states are often distinctive. A Pacific 
app
oples. I recognise and welcome the efforts that are being made in the Pacific 
stat
ts in the past thirty or forty years. Yet, so far, we have not been able to secure a 
com
t 
rld (and the sites of major conflicts) the 
Pac
made, much remains to be achieved. The institutional arrangements for protecting fundamental 
human rights and upholding the international law of human rights in the Pacific states leaves much 
roach to human rights is therefore a timely initiative that could fulfil at once regional and 
national needs.  
Avoiding the backwater: I have addressed what I regard as an important aim for the future of 
Pacific nations and pe
es towards greater recognition and protection of human rights by intergovernmental 
organisations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, by 
national governments, by international organisations such as the United Nations Development 
Program, and by non-governmental organisations. However, it remains important to look to the 
future and to aim to secure further, and particularly institutional, achievements. 
In other regional protections for human rights, the world has witnessed remarkable 
developmen
parable instrument or institution in the Pacific region.88 The time has come to do something 
about these defaults. 
A Pacific Charter would provide an important practical and intellectual stimulus for the 
recognition and protection of the basic human rights of people living in the Pacific. It might also 
help to strengthen, in appropriate and mutually respectful ways, the important historical, cultural, 
political and legal ties between New Zealand, Australia and the nations of the Pacific Islands. Such 
a development would be a giant step for humanity towards a common law of human rights for the 
world. It is the type of development that, I believe, Cooke, were he still alive, would advocate and 
propagate.  
For a decade I served with him when we were both Commissioners of the International 
Commission of Jurists. In that body the focus of attention was always on upholding the rule of law, 
safeguarding fundamental human rights and pushing forward the new frontiers which these goals 
present for humanity. A neglected new frontier for universal human rights is the Pacific. So distan
from the great population and economic centres of the wo
ific region tends to be neglected by the rest of the world. In this sense, it is a kind of intellectual 
and legal backwater. As a result, some observers mistake the appellation of "Pacific" as an 
assurance that ours is a region of universal peace, tranquillity and justice. While progress has been 
  
For an overview of recent developments in the Asia-Pacific, see David K 88  Malcolm "Development of human 
J 178.  rights throughout the Asia-Pacific region" (2006) 80 AL
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d. The way forward is clear enough. What is 
req
s shy laughter and his searing intelligence. We who knew him 
can see th
r our own duty to do more for these causes in the world, and 
especially in the Pacific, our region. 
The Pacific will be the region of the twenty-first century. No longer neglected as a backwater for 
human rights observance and protection, it should become a new focus and an example for others of 
what can be achieved pacifically in multiracial and diverse societies in assuring respect for the 
fundamental dignity of all peoples and protecting their inalienable rights to justice. Robin Cooke 
showed the way. But will we follow? 
 
to be desired. As an essential attribute of good governance in the region, normative and institutional 
progress for the protection of human rights is neede
uired is the will, the means and the governmental and popular commitment to this noble ideal.  
VI THE ACHIEVEMENT AND THE DREAM 
Cooke believed in the ability of lawyers and the judiciary to make a "worthwhile contribution ... 
towards the evolution of more just national and international societies."89 During his lifetime, he 
certainly helped that evolution along in notable ways. He did so in New Zealand. He did so 
internationally and specifically in the Pacific region. 
So soon after Cooke's death, we are not able fully to evaluate his legacy. This is because it is not 
yet fully realised. His intellectual and institutional contributions continue to influence developments 
today. They will do so well into the future until the time comes when his is but another famous 
name in the legal lexicon of our tradition. Those who quote his words will not, like us, have known 
his sharp eyes, his quizzical look, hi
at his contribution has been enormous. Through his very substantial role in creating a 
distinctive New Zealand jurisprudence. Through his demand that law be expressed as simply as 
possible. Through his insistence that the law be fair and just for ordinary people. Through his 
promotion of universal human rights. Through his fearless approach to the judicial task. It is his 
commitment to universal human rights and the rule of law and his dream of an international 
common law that oblige us to conside
 
89  Cooke "A Sketch from the Blue Train", above n 9, 17. 
